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Abstract—Video consumption is one of the most popular Inter-
net activities worldwide. The emergence of sharing videos directly
recorded with smartphones raises important privacy concerns. In
this paper we propose P3LS, the first practical privacy-preserving
peer-to-peer live streaming system. To protect the privacy of
its users, P3LS relies on k-anonymity when users subscribe
to streams, and on plausible deniability for the dissemination
of video streams. Specifically, plausible deniability during the
dissemination phase ensures that an adversary is never able to
distinguish a user’s stream of interest from the fake streams
from a statistical analysis (i.e., using an analysis of variance).
We exhaustively evaluate P3LS and show that adversaries are
not able to identify the real stream of a user with very high
confidence. Moreover, P3LS consumes 30% less bandwidth than
the standard k-anonymity approach where nodes fully contribute
to the dissemination of k streams.
I. INTRODUCTION
Platforms that allow users to share video streams rapidly
became a prominent component of the Web ecosystem (e.g.,
300 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute and
almost 5 thousand million videos are watched each day [1]). In
addition, the widespread adoption of continuously connected
smartphones caused more and more users to consume and
share videos directly recorded with their smartphones during
their daily lives (e.g., Snapchat). The emergence of this new
pervasive usage considerably exposes the personal life of users
and raises serious privacy concerns.
To sustain the requirements of high video consumption
demand, many technologies and systems have been developed
to serve and optimize video streaming. For instance, adaptive
streaming over HTTP allows a client video player to dynam-
ically adjust the video bitrate as a function of the network
condition and CPU usage [2], and Content Delivery Networks
(CDNs) cache videos close to their consumption sites [3].
However, the high bitrates of the broadcast streams and the
quality of service requirements of video applications make
centralized solutions costly. To reduce this cost, peer-to-peer
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(P2P) or partially decentralized approaches have emerged as
key architectural solutions. Peer-to-peer (P2P) is an application
architecture paradigm that consists in distributing a service
among a set of nodes. P2P architectures can be made highly
resilient to failures and bring a cheaper scalability compared
to centralized architectures [4]. P2P-based applications have
been successfully developed to support various services (e.g.,
file sharing [5], video streaming [6], pub-sub [7]).
During a P2P video streaming session, a special node - the
source - streams a video and at the same time generates chunks
of this video, called updates. These chunks are then sent, as
they are generated, to nodes that subscribed to this stream
through either structured, tree or mesh-based, or unstructured
gossip-based dissemination. These approaches build overlay
networks gathering nodes interested by the same video stream
and willing to participate in the dissemination of video chunks
by exchanging them. After it has been emitted by the source,
a chunk of a video stream is exchanged between peers during
a predetermined duration. After this duration has elapsed, it
can then be played by the peers’ video applications.
Privacy has attracted a lot of attention lately and mea-
sures have appeared to protect users against invasive track-
ing or massive data collection of personal information, not
only of technological kind but also legislative (c.f., Europe’s
GDPR [8]). However, so far, no system has been proposed
to ensure user privacy in video streaming systems despite
the widespread adoption and use of these applications. While
relying on P2P systems should decrease privacy leaks by
avoiding the centralization of the information, in practice these
systems exhibit an increased threat surface in the form of
privacy threats from other nodes if information related to
what users are watching becomes public. Several works have
highlighted [9] or measured [10], [11] to which extent P2P
protocols leak information about their users.
The subscription phase in a video streaming system can
be either explicit or implicit. With explicit subscription, each
stream is publicly associated with an overlay of nodes. Partial
or full membership lists of these overlays are publicly ad-
vertised, which allows new nodes to directly join an overlay.
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However, evaluating this membership relation also allows
adversaries to infer the stream a node is watching, since
through this list a node is directly linked with a stream it
consumes. With implicit subscription, each node maintains a
profile of interests (e.g., its last consumed items) which is used
to dynamically discover and build an overlay of nodes sharing
similar interests. However, as these profiles are exchanged
between nodes, the interests of users can easily be discovered.
Moreover, in both cases, videos watched by a user can be
inferred by other nodes during their interactions (i.e., from
the streams they received and disseminated).
To protect the interests of a user from being inferred, several
privacy-preserving schemes have been proposed at different
levels. Firstly, several works have leveraged anonymity to
improve user privacy [12], [13]. However, in the context
of video stream system, relying on anonymizing overlays
introduces a substantial performance overhead. For example,
communications between two nodes using Tor [14] go through
five relay nodes, which introduces a significant delay. In
addition, a video streaming system running on Tor would
require nodes to dedicate a six fold increased communication
bandwidth to video streaming compared to what non-privacy
preserving solutions demand. In addition, the Tor project
reports a total network capacity of 300Gbps and a current
utilization of 120Gbps1, which suggests that a large scale use
of Tor for video streaming will likely lead to a collapse of the
network. Other anonymity approaches, like Dissent [15] and
RAC [16], would only worsen performance. Secondly, a node
can hide its interests by subscribing in several membership lists
and relaying streams in several network overlays. By doing
so, the node benefits from k-anonymity in the subscription
phase by making its real interest indistinguishable from fake
ones. However, this solution significantly increases bandwidth
consumption since a node receives k streams when it is
interested in only one.
Dissemination protocols introducing randomness have been
proposed in order to ensure plausible deniability [17]. Ran-
domness prevents an adversary from determining without
doubts the interests of a user, when observing the exchanged
chunks during dissemination. These approaches rely on a
difficult to control trade-off between privacy and utility. In the
context of video streaming, this utility is captured by the rele-
vance of the video stream received and the quality of service.
Moreover, all the proposed solutions provide no information to
their users, explaining the impact of the protection mechanism
on the overhead of the system. This lack of transparency
makes it difficult for users to control and parameterize the
protection mechanisms according to their expectations. We
believe that bringing more transparency to users about their
privacy and utility trade-offs will improve the adoption of
privacy-preserving systems.
In this paper, we therefore present P3LS, the first practical
privacy-preserving live streaming system that enforces a user-
defined lower bound on their privacy. P3LS preserves the pri-
1https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html as of Dec 6, 2018.
vacy of its users by protecting both the subscription phase and
the dissemination phase. We employ three core techniques to
achieve this goal. Firstly, P3LS protects the stream subscription
of users through k-anonymity by hiding their real subscription
among fake ones. Secondly, to avoid revealing the stream
watched by users through their dissemination patterns, P3LS
relies on a novel dissemination protocol ensuring plausible
deniability. This dissemination protocol propagates multiple
streams (to multiple nodes) through different dissemination
preferences that respect privacy properties controlled by an
analysis of variance. Lastly, P3LS leverages random sampling
to request multiple streams through a push-based gossip pro-
tocol from a dynamically and randomly selected set of nodes.
P3LS enables nodes to control their dissemination prefer-
ences, while enforcing their ultimate privacy guarantee, which
allows a node to control the amount of bandwidth spent to
obfuscate its real subscription. P3LS is the first protocol to
enforce plausible deniability against any set of nodes, poten-
tially controlled by a risk-averse honest-but-curious adversary,
in the sense that it is not able to statistically infer which stream
a user is more interested in.
We implemented and exhaustively experimented P3LS using
simulations with up to 50,000 nodes. We show that P3LS is
able to generate a large spectrum of privacy and performance
overhead combinations providing a large choice of utility and
privacy trade-offs to users. We were then able to show that the
privacy property we enforce protects peers against adversaries
controlling any number of nodes in the system: an adversary
cannot avoid a high level of false positives and false negatives,
when trying to identify the stream of interest of a user. Finally,
P3LS is superior to the classical strategy that consists in
subscribing to k streams instead of one, by exhibiting up to
30% better performance, and providing satisfying statistical
privacy guarantees.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the system and threat models we consider.
Section III provides on overview of P3LS. Section IV describes
in details P3LS’s design. Section V details our experimental
setup. Section VI reports the performance evaluation of this
solution. Section VII reviews related work while Section VIII
concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
In this section, we describe our system model (Section II-A)
and the adversary we consider (Section II-B).
A. System model
We consider a fully decentralized system where a set of
peers are distributed over the Internet and are willing to
cooperate to receive and exchange a digital stream (e.g.,
videos, music). In particular, each stream is generated by a
special node (i.e., the source) that generates and periodically
sends chunks of this content (also called updates) to a sub-
set of interested nodes. Updates are exchanged during RTE
seconds after their emission by the source. After receiving an
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Fig. 1. Overview of the system for a node N1 using k=2.
update, nodes can forward it during t seconds to other nodes,
according to an epidemics based dissemination [18].
We assume that a video is uniquely identified, for example
using its source’s identifier (i.e., its IP address) associated to
a stream ID, a number of updates released per second, and
an expected duration. We also assume that videos are not
associated to semantics. We assume that users have a unique
and publicly known identity (e.g., their IP address) and have
access to secure encryption and signature schemes.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that a tracker service
is available, where all sources can register their streams, and
which collects a bootstrapping set of nodes interested in those
streams. A peer subscribing to a stream is then able to contact
this tracker, and obtain the bootstrapping set of nodes. We
assume videos with the same duration or used padding to have
the same duration. We also assume that each peer is interested
in only one stream. We do not aim at protecting the privacy of
the sources of the streams, but since there is only one source
per stream, they could rely on an anonymous communication
system to inject their updates in the associated overlay. Lastly,
as the notion of privacy sensitive information can be differently
defined, we assume that users are willing to protect their own
privacy with different preferences.
B. Adversary model
We consider an honest-but-curious [19] adversary which
passively collects information about peers. Specifically, the
adversary may control a set of peers that correctly follow the
protocols, and obtain from them the details of their interactions
with other peers. We assume that the adversary is not able to
monitor the entire communication network, and in particular
the interactions between two peers it does not control. This
adversary aims at determining the real interest of users.
However, this adversary is risk-averse, means that it avoids
to link a user with a stream without being truly convinced
about it. This adversary model is inspired by judiciary systems,
where convicting an innocent is deemed unacceptable.
III. PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
In this section, we provide an overview of P3LS. Throughout
this section, we refer to Figure 1 which provides an illustration
of this overview.
Once users are aware of the list of streams available in the
system (e.g., from a centralized tracker service as described
Null hypothesis H0 (k-anonymity) is
Decision True (k-anonymity) False (Plausible deniability)
Fail to reject H0 Confidence (1− α) Type II error (β)
Reject H0 Type I error (α) Power (1− β)
TABLE I
DECISION TABLE OF A STATISTICAL HYPOTHESIS TEST.
in Section IV), they can subscribe to their actual interest.
To avoid revealing this interest, P3LS also subscribes to fake
interests by picking at random k − 1 streams in the list of
available streams. In addition, to avoid to leak information
from the popularity of the streams, this selection enforces
that these k streams have the same distribution of popularity
than the whole streams available in the system. Figure 1
illustrates P3LS with k = 2 for a node N1 that subscribed to its
stream of interest c1 and to another stream c2. By relying on
gossip protocols, each node builds and maintains an overlay
network associated to each subscription. On the right part of
Figure 1, node N1 is shown in the overlays associated to c1
and c2. These overlays list nodes that N1 is aware of and
which are able to disseminate the associated streams.
Once the subscription phase is done, the dissemination
phase can start. This dissemination also relies on a push-
based gossip protocol to request a given proportion of the live
chunks of a stream. More precisely, a node willing to receive
a specific stream selects at random peers that are part of the
associated overlay to request chunks. In Figure 1, node N1
contacts nodes N2 and N3 for content c1, and nodes N5 and
N6 for content c2. To avoid revealing the real interest of the
users while ensuring users’ privacy, the dissemination has to be
carefully performed. Specifically, an adversary should not be
able to infer a real interest by analyzing the different requests
and, for instance, discovering that a node has significantly
more updates of a given content than another. To achieve that,
P3LS calibrates requests to ensure the plausible deniability
property [20]. This property ensures that an adversary can not
be certain to identify the real interest of the users. Practically,
P3LS ensures that requests for both the real and fake interests
are indistinguishable from a statistical properties point of view.
More precisely, we consider the one-way analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) as a statistical test to decide whether the
observed difference between two sets of requests (i.e., streams
requested for both the real and the fake interests) is statistically
significant above a predefined confidence level (1 − α). The
goal of the ANOVA test is to decide whether to reject or not the
null hypothesis H0, which is the hypothesis that the streams
are equally requested by a node. In P3LS, we extend this
ANOVA test to identify whether the set of requests associated
to the real interest is statistically different from all the k − 1
requests generated by the subscriptions to fake interests. By
construction, in P3LS, the ANOVA test runs on vectors of
coefficients generated using normal laws.
Table I details the different decisions an adversary could
take when studying a peer using either k-anonymity or plausi-
ble deniability, and for each scenario names the probability to
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associate the peer to either k-anonymity or plausible deniabil-
ity. Table I uses the standard notations associated to hypothesis
testing, which we adapted to our context. For example, α is
the probability for the adversary to associate a peer using k-
anonymity, i.e., participating equally in all contents, as a node
using plausible deniability, which would lead the adversary to
associate a user to a stream.
As further described in Section IV, peers generate in ad-
vance the percent of streams they will request during any
interaction for a given subscription (called vectors of plausible
deniable coefficients in the following). In Figure 1 (left part),
node N1 precomputed two vectors, one for content c1 whose
first values are 30 and 40, and one for content c2 whose first
values are 10 and 30. Node N1 then uses these coefficients
during its interactions with the other nodes. However, we
leverage ANOVA tests to generate vectors of requested chunks
that cannot be statistically distinguished from the others,
given an assumed maximum risk α to wrongly reject the
null hypothesis. Consequently, according to the privacy policy
defined by the user, P3LS is able to control the bandwidth
improvement compared to k-anonymity.
IV. SYSTEM DETAILS
We now describe in details P3LS’s design. First, in Sec-
tion IV-A, we review P3LS’s parameters and explain how users
can determine their values. We then describe the subscription
phase in Section IV-B before detailing in Section IV-C how
peers generate the vectors of coefficients used during their
interactions with other peers. Lastly, Section IV-D details the
dissemination phase.
A. Individual Privacy Settings
P3LS is user-driven. Each user can control the expected level
of privacy. To achieve that, users can control two different
parameters: i) α: the upper bound of the probability that the
adversary identifies a node as a node having a higher interest
in one of the k streams (i.e., the maximum type I error in
Table I), and ii) k: the number of subscriptions (i.e., including
the real and k − 1 fake ones).
The value of both k and α have an impact on both privacy
and performance. A higher k value better protects a user’s
privacy by making its real interest indistinguishable among
more fake ones. However, nodes have to be ready to commit
more bandwidth consumption. A larger α value better protects
the privacy of nodes by making the vectors of coefficients
more statistically similar to each other, therefore making nodes
receive more equally in all streams. To balance the utility and
privacy trade-off and helping users to define the value of these
parameters, users can leverage the perceived quality of service
(e.g., a too degraded quality results of an unbalanced trade-off
on the utility side).
B. Subscription Phase
Nodes never declare their real interest (i.e., the stream asso-
ciated to their real interest). Instead, nodes enforce their pri-
vacy through k-anonymity on explicit subscriptions to streams.
Specifically, they declare being interested on k streams simul-
taneously: their real interest and k − 1 fake interests. A node
maintains a profile gathering the list of stream IDs associated
to its current k subscriptions which therefore will be available
to be disseminated to others.
In video streaming, all videos do not receive the same
popularity. Indeed, the distribution of human consumption on
social media and online streaming platforms is characterized
by the well-known long tail [21]. This heterogeneity in term
of popularity can give assumption of the real interest of a
user if this interest is a popular video and all fake ones
are non popular for instance. To avoid that, P3LS adopts a
scheme similar to t-closeness [22]. Specifically, the selection
of the k − 1 streams ensures that the distribution of the
popularity of all k streams follow the same distribution than
all streams in the system. For sake of simplicity, we collect the
global popularity of each video through the tracker. However,
more advanced solution can be considered such as a secure
aggregation through a multi-party computation protocol [23].
By periodically contacting the tracker, each node is aware of
the actual popularity of each video and can use it to carefully
select its fake subscriptions.
P3LS manages overlay networks associated to the sub-
scriptions of the user. More precisely, P3LS relies on gossip
protocols to build and maintain multiple overlay networks.
The bottom gossip layer implements a random peer sampling
(RPS) service [24], [25]. By gossiping random views between
nodes, this RPS service ensures the construction of a continu-
ously changing and randomly graph of nodes, which is made
of a unique connected component, and the quickly removing
of offline nodes. The upper gossip layer, in turn, manages the
overlay networks associated to the current k subscriptions of
the user (i.e., one overlay per subscription). To manage these
overlay networks, nodes exchange both their profile and the
profile of nodes that is aware of with random nodes (i.e., part
of its RPS) and nodes part of the overlays associated to their
subscriptions. By doing so, nodes learn about new other nodes
in the system subscribing to the same streams and able to
serve chunks in the dissemination phase. These new nodes are
used to feed and dynamically maintain the overlay networks.
Lastly, after that the dissemination of a stream ended, nodes
can remove the associated subscription (i.e., the associated
overlay network).
C. Plausibly Deniable Coefficients
Each node taking part in the dissemination of a stream
(either associated to a real or a fake interest) is in charge of
both requesting chunks and serving requests that it receives.
A request contains the ID of the associated stream and a co-
efficient indicating the expected percent of chunks. To ensure
privacy, requests associated to the real interest should not be
distinguishable from requests associated to fake interests. To
achieve that, P3LS carefully defines a set of coefficients for
each of its subscriptions ensuring plausible deniability. More
precisely, P3LS ensures that the set of coefficients are not
distinguishable from a statistical test based on an one-way
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Algorithm 1 Plausibly deniable vectors
Input: k: number of streams (including the real interest)
α: maximum type-I error the adversary may take when rejecting the null
hypothesis
N : number of coefficients to generate per stream
mreal: targeted proportion of the stream of interest to receive
mobf: targeted proportion of the obfuscating streams to receive
σ: variance of the normal laws used to generate the vectors
Uses: ANOVA test returns p value; instance anova-pvalue
Normal distribution generator of N coefficients with mean m and standard
deviation σ; instance Normal(m, σ, N)
Output: Creal = C[0]: a vector of N coefficients
Cobf = C[1], · · · , C[k − 1]: k − 1 vectors of N coefficients
∀i ∈ {1, · · · , k−1}, Creal and Cobf[i] are not statistically distinguishable
through an ANOVA test with confidence level (1− α)
1: int[][] C = int[k][N]
2: int count = 0
3: while True do
4: Creal = C[0] = Normal(mreal/N, σ,N)
5: for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 do
6: Cobf[i] = C[i] = Normal(mobf/N, σ,N)
7: end for
8: if anova-pvalue(C[0], C[1], · · · , C[k − 1]) < α then
9: break
10: end if
11: count++
12: if count mod 10000 == 0 AND mobf < mreal then
13: mobf++
14: count = 0
15: end if
16: end while
17: M = max(C[i][j] | 0 ≤ i < k, 0 ≤ j < N)
18: for each C[i][j] do
19: C[i][j] = max(0, C[i][j]) ∗ M
100
20: end for
21: return (Creal, Cobf)
analysis of variance (ANOVA). In other words, the probability
that an adversary analyzing coefficients identifies that the
means value of one distribution is larger than another is
bounded and under control through a privacy parameter.
We use Algorithm 1 to generate vectors of coefficients pro-
viding plausible deniability [20]. This algorithm uses normal
laws to generate the vector of coefficients, as an ANOVA
test assumes. Algorithm 1 uses the user-specified parameters
k and α, that we previously described in Section IV-A, and
some additional parameters that we set for the user, before
generating the vectors of coefficients: N is the number of
coefficients to generate per content, mreal is the expected sum
of the coefficients in the vector associated to the real interest
of a peer, mobf is the expected sum of the coefficients in the
vectors associated to the obfuscating interests, and σ is the
variance of the two normal laws. This algorithm draws random
vectors generated using the two normal laws (i.e., in lines 5-8,
Algorithm 1), until the ANOVA test is not able to reject the
null hypothesis above the specified confidence level 1−α (i.e.,
in lines 10-12).
To expect the means of the generated vectors to be different,
and therefore expect some performance gains when using the
coefficients in a practical protocol, one would choose mobf <
mreal. However, the choice of the values of mreal and mobf
has an impact on the completion time of the algorithm and
on the empirical means of the generated vectors. When mreal
and mobf are too close to each other, the empirical difference
between the means of the vectors is limited. When mreal and
mobf are too far from each other the algorithm takes longer
to finish, and may take an unbounded amount of time. To
maintain high expected performance improvement, and a short
execution time, after every 10,000 unsuccessful generation of
vectors Algorithm 1 decreases the difference between mobf and
mreal, by incrementing mobf (i.e., in lines 14-18). We measured
that generating the coefficients took less than 2 seconds for
each of the configurations we studied. Finally, the values in
the vectors are normalized between 0 and 100, so that peers
can use them to indicate a proportion of a stream it is willing
to receive or send (i..e, in lines 21-24).
To summarize, Algorithm 1 allows a peer to obtain a vector
for its real interest with a larger mean than the means of the
vectors associated to the fake streams. In practice, this will
result in the peer being able to mainly receive the stream it
is interested in, and save bandwidth by limiting its reception
of fake streams. Therefore, plausible deniability offers more
flexibility than k-anonymity, since it can be extended to k-
anonymity (i.e., when α = 100), or reduced to providing no-
privacy at all (i.e., when α = 0).
All vectors of coefficients a node chooses can be revealed to
an adversary since even then the plausible deniability property
would stand.
D. Dissemination Phase
Once a vector of coefficients is built for each subscription,
nodes can exchange together to request and serve requests of
content. P3LS adopts an exchange protocol working by round.
Periodically (i.e., at each round), a node changes the list of
nodes with which it exchanges during the dissemination. That
includes the corresponding nodes associated to the initiated
requests, and served nodes.
Peers follow Algorithm 2 to select the nodes they interact
with and select coefficients to use during their interactions.
This algorithm basically says that for each stream ci it wants to
receive, a peer randomly selects N nodes to contact based on
the associated overlay network. Then, for each selected peer,
the algorithm selects a random coefficient in the precomputed
plausibly deniable vector associated to stream ci. In addition,
a peer never distributes two different coefficients to the same
peer. Indeed, nodes keep in memory the coefficient they have
exchanged with any other node about a given stream, so
that they never reveal more than one of their precomputed
coefficient to a given node. This makes it more difficult for
an adversary trying to guess the α values that the user used
to generate its coefficients.
Basically, Algorithm 2 makes nodes contact a fixed number
N of partners per communication round. If a node selects a
partner with which it had an interaction in the past it has to
reuse the same coefficient (lines 8-9), otherwise it randomly
selects one of its coefficient (lines 11-12). The number of
partners contacted can be dynamically adapted to increase the
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Algorithm 2 Partners selection
Input: N : the number of partners to select per stream
Li: the membership list associated to stream Ci
Sc: the streams the peer subscribed to
V [ci]: the vectors of precomputed interaction coefficients for each stream
subscribed to
past partners coeff : a 2-dimensional map that accumulates the inter-
action coefficients chosen per partner and per stream
Output: partners coeff : a 2-dimensional map of interaction coefficients
chosen per elected partner and per stream
1: partners coeff = {}{}
2: for ci ∈ Sc do
3: while partners coeff [ci].size() < N do
4: p = random(Li)
5: while p ∈ partners coeff [ci] do
6: p = random(Li)
7: end while
8: if p ∈ past partners coeff then
9: partners coeff [ci][p] = past partners coeff [ci][p]
10: else
11: partners coeff [ci][p] = random(V [ci])
12: past partners coeff [ci][p] = partners coeff [ci][p]
13: end if
14: end while
15: end for
16: return partners coeff
probability of receiving all chunks while minimizing duplicate
receptions.
P3LS is highly tolerant to churn. Users can leave, or join,
the system at any point in time. When selecting partners to
receive updates from, if a peer realizes that one of them is not
answering to messages, it can simply select another node to
contact, select a coefficient and initiate an exchange with it.
When a node receives a request with a specific coefficient,
it selects at random a coefficient available in its plausibly
deniable vector and serves the request up to the minimum of
each of the two coefficients (i.e., the local and the received
one). Using the minimum of the coefficients to determine
the percent of chunk to serve is necessary for both privacy
and performance reasons. First, it is necessary for privacy
reasons since if a node sends more updates than its coefficient
indicates, then it may provide additional information to the
other node. Second, it is necessary for performance reasons,
since it allows a node to limit the number of updates it receives
per interaction. Otherwise, a node would not have any control
on the amount of duplicate update receptions.
When node B chooses a coefficient for its interaction with
node A, we can distinguish two situations: i) if node B
exchanged some updates from a stream c1 with node A in a
previous round, then node B has to reuse the same coefficient
it used in the past; ii) otherwise, node B has a little more
freedom, and can slightly optimize the choice of its coefficient,
for example by choosing its coefficient for stream c1 that is
the closest to the one it received.
Upon reception, updates from a stream are inserted into a
set of updates to retransmit whose keys are the times at which
they were emitted by their source. Updates in such sets are kept
ordered according to their reception times by the peer. Peers
keep retransmitting the updates they have received in the last
t seconds in variable proportion and deterministically. This
epidemics model has been intensively studied, e.g., in [18].
In P3LS, peers determine the number of updates they send
during an interaction depending on the minimum of the two
peers’ communicated coefficients, which is multiplied by the
number of updates generated by the source per second. More
precisely, a peer sends the oldest updates from its set of
updates to retransmit. For a given stream, nodes are always
able to send the specified number of updates, since updates
are retransmitted during RTE seconds after their emission by
the source. In addition, since updates are randomly transmitted
in the system, the updates sent by a node during an interaction
do not reveal its preference for a given stream.
First, sending the first received updates does not harm
the correct propagation of updates, since they are randomly
exchanged among all peers. Second, this mechanism ensures
that two nodes requesting updates for stream ci to a given
node cannot learn more than the maximum of the interaction
coefficients of the proportion of updates the requested node
actually has. In addition, the requested node also controls
the interaction coefficients (thanks to the min operation), so
that these two interactions cannot leak too much information.
This property also avoid nodes to fully receive the content
of fake streams, therefore improving their performance over a
k-anonymity approach, while receiving all of their stream of
interest (Section VI).
Depending on other nodes, this simple interaction process
may however create redundant reception of updates. In addi-
tion, a node may also fail to receive some updates, if they are
not disseminated for long enough in the system, which in turn
would force nodes to increase the number of simultaneous
interactions they request per round to reach their reception
objectives. In the performance evaluation section, we show
that in practice nodes can receive all the updates, and that the
amount of duplicate receptions incurs a reasonable amount of
bandwidth overhead.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section we present the experimental setup we used
to evaluate P3LS including the methodology (Section V-A),
the metrics (Section V-B) and the system parameters (Sec-
tion V-C).
A. Methodology
Our experiments are simulation-based. In our simulation,
we consider a system gathering 50,000 nodes. Among all
these nodes, 10% of them implements P3LS (called P3LS-
SET) while the others subscribed to k streams simultaneously
and participate equally in each (called K-ANONYMOUS-SET).
Nodes randomly subscribed to a variable number of streams k
they wish to receive and we consider a live streaming system
with 5, 000 different streams available. The popularity of these
streams is defined to follow a long tail [21]. Each stream is
emitted at a rate of 600kbps and split in 100 updates of 6kb
(i.e., all streams have the same size as described Section II).
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During an experiment, users subscribe and fully consume
multiple streams sequentially. Nodes play the updates in their
video application after RTE = 8 seconds have elapsed since
their release by their source. In addition nodes can forward
newly received updates during t = 2 seconds after their
reception. The considered value for a P3LS round is one
second (i.e., nodes contact new partners to request updates
every second). For integrity, updates are transmitted along with
their source’s signature, which is a 2048-bits RSA signature.
Lastly, we do not bound the communication links bandwidth.
B. Metrics
We use a set of theoretical and system metrics to assess the
performance of P3LS:
1) Theoretical analysis: We theoretically analyzed the ex-
pected bandwidth improvement from the plausibly deniable
coefficients. The values obtained represent the theoretical
improvement bounds one cannot expect to exceed. We also
studied the erosion of privacy as an adversary discovers a
variable proportion of the coefficients of a node.
2) Privacy: The privacy is measured as the average error-
rate prediction of an adversary willing to identify if users favor
one stream (i.e., if users are part of the P3LS-SET or part of
the K-ANONYMOUS-SET). More specifically, it is the average
probability that an adversary wrongly decides that users are
part of the K-ANONYMOUS-SET (i.e., α in Table I) or part of
the P3LS-SET (i.e., 1−β in Table I). This privacy metric is the
exact opposite of the adversary’s success rate metric [26], and
has the advantage of being intuitive since a larger adversary
missing rate means more privacy for users.
3) Bandwidth consumption: We monitored the bandwidth
of nodes both in reception and in emission.
C. Parameters
To generate the vectors of plausible deniable coefficients of
P3LS, nodes part of the P3LS-SET use the following initial
values: mreal = 100, mobf = 0, and σ = 5. However, as
previously written, the value mobf and mobf can be modified
to ensure the termination of Algorithm 1. During the experi-
ments, we do not consider dynamic values for parameter N ,
and consider future work the dynamic modification of P3LS’s
parameters by a peer.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the experimental evaluation
of P3LS over three dimensions: a theoretical analysis of the
capacity of P3LS to decrease the bandwidth consumption
compared to a pure k-anonymity scheme (Section VI-A),
the uncertainty of a adversary about the real interest of the
user even if the adversary control a population of nodes
(Section VI-B), and a practical evaluation of the bandwidth
consumption overhead (Section VI-C). We also analysis the
impact of P3LS on the popularity of videos.
A. Plausibly Deniable Coefficients
We first theoretically studied the improvement in term of
bandwidth consumption provided by the plausible deniability
property implemented in P3LS (i.e., the results of Algo-
rithm 1). To do so, we assume that each coefficient in the
plausible deniability vectors would lead to the reception of
the corresponding proportion of a stream.
Figure 2 reports the theoretical bandwidth consumption
of P3LS compared to receiving only the stream of interest for
various parameters. To plot this graph, we study the perfor-
mance improvement over k-anonymity for k ∈ [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7],
N ∈ [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12], and α ∈ [0.1, 0.4, 0.8]. First,
one can observe that plausible deniability provides a wide
range of performance and adversary missing rate. This large
spectrum of values makes users able to define a flexible utility
and privacy trade-off. As expected, using a larger α parameter
increases the privacy of users. Using larger k and N values
increases the theoretical cost of the coefficients generated,
since it is less probable to generate more or larger vectors that
are plausibly deniable, without modifying the mobf parameter
in Algorithm 1.
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Fig. 2. Adversary missing rate versus theoretical performance overhead over
the no-privacy configuration.
Second, we studied the bandwidth improvement of plausible
deniability coefficients over k-anonymity coefficients obtained
when the means of the two normal laws used in Algorithm 1
are equal, when computed over similar k values. Figure 3
details the theoretical bandwidth decrease over k-anonymity.
Using plausible deniable coefficients has therefore the poten-
tial to improve performance up to slightly more than 40%
depending on the considered parameters.
B. Resiliency Against an Honest-but-Curious Adversary
As written in the system and threat models, P3LS enforces
that an adversary controlling a variable number of peers in
the system can never identify the interest of a peer above
a user-specified confidence level. However, one could wonder
whether observing a subset of the coefficients could give away
enough information for the adversary to correctly identify
the stream of interest of a node. We therefore studied the
erosion of privacy when the number of nodes controlled by
an honest-but-curious adversary increases. More precisely, we
studied the errors an adversary would make if it were to
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Fig. 3. Privacy vs. theoretical performance improvement over k-anonymity.
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Fig. 4. Proportion of peers using k-anonymity believed to be using plausible
deniability (Type I error rate) depending on the number of coefficients
revealed.
take a decision based on a given number of the coefficients
of all vectors. In this section, we use (K,N) = (3, 5) and
α ∈ [0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8].
Figure 4 presents the proportion of peers for which the
adversary would reject the null hypothesis depending on the
number of coefficients it could observe, even though they
would be using k-anonymity. As the adversary observes more
coefficients, the proportion of wrong decisions it would take
does not follow a clear pattern. It may decrease with small
values of α but may also increase with larger values.
Figure 5 presents the proportion of peers that used plausibly
deniable coefficients that are identified as such by the adver-
sary. Again this proportion is never equal to 100%, and may
decrease or increase depending on the number of coefficients
revealed. An adversary that would observe a subset of the
coefficients a node has precomputed would therefore not be
able to take any insightful decision about whether or not nodes
are using plausibly deniable coefficients.
C. Bandwidth Consumption Overhead
Figure 6 depicts the performance improvement observed in
the complete P3LS protocol compared to the same version
using k-anonymity. It is the practical equivalent of Figure 3,
and the difference between those two figures show the impact
of deploying privacy-preserving mechanisms in real systems
on performance. However, the performance improvement of
nodes compared to k-anonymity is still significant. Nodes
2 3 4 5
Number of coefficients revealed
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 p
la
us
ib
ly
 d
en
ia
bl
e 
pe
er
s
( , K, N) = (0.1, 3, 5)
( , K, N) = (0.2, 3, 5)
( , K, N) = (0.4, 3, 5)
( , K, N) = (0.6, 3, 5)
( , K, N) = (0.8, 3, 5)
Fig. 5. Proportions of peers using plausible deniability believed to be using
k-anonymity (Type II error rate) depending on the number of coefficients
revealed.
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Fig. 6. Adversary missing rate versus performance improvement (bandwidth
decrease) over a subscription to k streams.
can expect to save up to 25% of bandwidth compared to k-
anonymity. For this figure, we limited the plotted values to
those corresponding to α in [0.1, 0.4, 0.8].
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Fig. 7. Evolution of the bandwidth consumption depending on time during
an experiment.
Figure 7 shows the bandwidth consumption of peers in the
system for (α, k,N) = (0.1, 3, 5). The bandwidth consump-
tion of all nodes increase as a function of the number of
nodes they contact. Since most of the nodes use k-anonymity,
their download and upload bandwidths are very similar and
are represented by a single line. In this example, peers using
plausible deniability have a smaller bandwidth consumption,
needing around 4.3Mbps, while peers using k-anonymity re-
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quire 5.4Mbps.
Lastly, using the same settings, Figure 8 shows the cumu-
lative distribution function of the amount of each multimedia
stream that peers using plausible deniability in the system are
able to reconstitute. This figure confirms that these nodes can
play more than 95% of their stream of interest, while they
receive a similar lower amount of the two obfuscating streams
(between 75 and 94%).
D. Impact on Popularity
P3LS has an impact on the popularity of videos. Figure 9
depicts the distribution of the real popularity of items in
the system as well as the resulting popularity for P3LS with
varying k. As mentioned in Section V-A, we follow a power
law to define the popularity of each item. Consequently, the
distribution of the item popularity follows a long tail, i.e.,
only a small fraction of the item depicts a high popularity. As
shown on the figure, by adding fake subscriptions, our solution
artificially increases the popularity of items. This side effect
has the advantage to improve the distribution of unpopular
contents as more nodes can help in their dissemination.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present background information on
k-anonymity, and we review the related work on privacy,
accountability, trust, and plausible deniability in P2P systems.
a) k-anonymity: Relying only on k-anonymity is not
enough in some cases. For instance, requesting a database
protected by k-anonymity can reveal the sensitive information
if all the k selected entries share the same value. This concern
has been addressed by the introduction of l-diversity [27]
which extends k-anonymity by additionally enforcing that at
least l distinct values are present for each sensitive field for
each anonymity group. Then, t-closeness [22] is a further
extension of l-diversity. Instead of just guaranteeing a good
representation of sensitive values, this approach enforces that
the distribution of every sensitive attribute inside anonymity
groups must be the same than the distribution of this attribute
in the whole dataset, modulo a threshold t.
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Fig. 9. P3LS artificially increases the popularity of streams.
b) Privacy in P2P: Several works have studied privacy
in P2P systems, including privacy-preserving collaborative
filtering [28], [29], accountability verifications [30], publish-
subscribe systems [7], [31], or content-based routing with
Intel SGX [32]. In the context of collaborative filtering, [17]
shows how nodes can maintain an obfuscated profile of their
interests, and exchange their profiles to route messages to the
nodes that are willing to receive them. This approach provides
differential privacy to the nodes, but it cannot be applied to
video streaming as nodes do not receive all the updates they
are theoretically interested in, which would prevent them from
visualizing a video stream.
c) Accountability: Several works have described how
to modify P2P content dissemination systems to limit the
impact of selfish behaviors in peer-to-peer content dissemi-
nation systems [33]–[36]. Belenkiy et al. [37] describe how
cryptocurrency can help making a file sharing P2P system
accountable with privacy, through the use of a central bank.
PAG [30] considers the problem of detecting selfish nodes
in gossip-based dissemination systems without infringing on
the privacy of correct nodes. However, the identity of nodes
inside the membership list is not protected, and anyone able
to determine which content is propagated would be able to
associate a streaming session, and therefore all the nodes in
the membership list, with the content disseminated.
d) Trust-based P2P systems: OneSwarm [12] allows
users to determine how much trust they place in other peers
to protect their interests. This requires manual intervention
from the user. Whisper [38] is a middleware that enables
group communications with some privacy guarantees, thanks
to multi-hops communications. Namely, a node is not able
to observe the membership of a group it is not part of, or the
content being exchanged in that group. Lu et al. [39] describes
a system where nodes rely on a set of trusted collaborators
to shield their actions. This category of papers consider that
nodes in a group trust each other, which is an assumption we
do not make in P3LS.
e) Plausible deniability: Mistrustful P2P [40] relies on
erasure coding to avoid advertising users’ interests. Chunks of
a content are splitted into n fragments. In order to recover
a chunk of content, a user then needs to collect at least
k of the corresponding n fragments. Nodes then ask for,
and transmit, these fragments instead of the original chunks.
Mistrustful P2P then organizes interactions between nodes so
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that a node can choose to preserve its plausible deniability
property against any set of c nodes. However, it is not clear
how users can participate in Mistrustful P2P without first
joining a membership that is associated to their content of
interest. Plausibly deniable systems have also been described
for encryption on mobile devices [41]. SwarmScreen [10], in
turn, aims at preventing communities of nodes interested in a
similar content from being identified. Indeed, nodes sharing
interests are much more likely to connect to each other, and
an adversary observing the graph of connection between peers
could infer the communities. The authors proved this attack
to be feasible on BitTorrent traces. To prevent this attack,
and depending on their privacy and performance goals, nodes
leverage plausible deniability to establish some proportion of
random connections to obfuscate the connections graph.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present P3LS, the first live video streaming
protocol to enforce the privacy of its users both at the
subscription level, with k-anonymity, and at the dissemination
level, with plausible deniability. Compared to k-anonymity,
P3LS allows users to tune the level of privacy they want to
maintain, and to reduce their bandwidth overhead to up to
30%. On the other hand, plausible deniability in dissemination
ensures that an adversary is not able to distinguish the real
and fake streams from a statistical analysis (i.e., using an
analysis of variance). To do so, P3LS precompute a set of
plausibly deniable vectors of coefficients that nodes use in
their interactions with other peers to receive content.
Although a user usually watches a single video, considering
multiple subscriptions is part of future work.
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